The Art of Action

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The intelligence of an organization is never equal to the sum of the intelligence of the people within it

In 1911, Frederick Winslow Taylor’s classic The Principles of Scientific Management enshrined the machine model for several generations. This approach to management rests on three premises: 
In principle it is possible to know all you need to know to be able to plan what to do. 
Planners and doers should be separated. 
“There is but one right way.”

Strategic planning rose and fell. Its hubris was perfect knowledge, its fatal flaw the increasing rate of unpredictable changes in the environment. Between inception and execution, every plan could be derailed by something unexpected, and most plans were. So what was the point of planning? Surely a company needs some sort of direction?

At its most simple, executing strategy is about planning what to do in order to achieve certain outcomes and making sure that the actions we have planned are actually carried out until the desired outcomes are achieved. In an unpredictable environment, this approach quickly falters. The longer and more rigorously we persist with it, the more quickly and completely things will break down. The environment we are in creates gaps between plans, actions, and outcomes:
The gap between plans and outcomes concerns knowledge: It is the difference between what we would like to know and what we actually know. It means that we cannot create perfect plans.
The gap between plans and actions concerns alignment: It is the difference between what we would like people to do and what they actually do. It means that even if we encourage them to switch off their brains, we cannot know enough about them to program them perfectly.
The gap between actions and outcomes concerns effects: It is the difference between what we hope our actions will achieve and what they actually achieve. We can never fully predict how the environment will react to what we do. It means that we cannot know in advance exactly what outcomes the actions of our organization are going to create.

Faced with a lack of knowledge, it seems logical to seek more detailed information. Faced with a problem of alignment, it feels natural to issue more detailed instructions. And faced with disappointment in the effects being achieved, it is quite understandable to impose more detailed controls. Unfortunately, these reactions do not solve the problem. In fact, they make it worse.

The model recognizes that our knowledge is always limited and seeks to do more with the knowledge we have. It unsentimentally places people and human nature at its core and seeks to direct people rather than control them.

DECIDE WHAT REALLY MATTERS You cannot create perfect plans, so do not attempt to do so. Do not plan beyond the circumstances you can foresee. Instead, use the knowledge which is accessible to you to work out the outcomes you really want the organization to achieve. Formulate your strategy as an intent rather than a plan.

2 GET THE MESSAGE ACROSS Having worked out what matters most now, pass the message on to others and give them responsibility for carrying out their part in the plan. Keep it simple. Don’t tell people what to do and how to do it. Instead, be as clear as you can about your intentions. Say what you want people to achieve and, above all, tell them why. Then ask them to tell you what they are going to do as a result.

3 GIVE PEOPLE SPACE AND SUPPORT Do not try to predict the effects your actions will have, because you can’t. Instead, encourage people to adapt their actions to realize the overall intention as they observe what is actually happening. Give them boundaries which are broad enough to take decisions for themselves and act on them.

The Three Gaps

War is an environment, he argued, in which getting simple things to happen is very difficult and getting difficult things to happen is impossible.

Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, who believed that the essence of war could be captured mathematically, through such things as the geometric relationship between the location of an army’s objective and its base.5 Clausewitz castigated von Bülow for distorting the nature of his object. He was trying to turn war into a science because that would make it understandable and tractable. That attempt, Clausewitz believed, created a dangerous delusion.

Venkatesh Rao spoke about this on a podcast with Shane Parrish saying that mental models end up being liabilities when you try to understand everything through the mental model and actively blocking actual information that can be useful. March 31, 2024 @ 2:19 PM

One leading Clausewitz scholar has summarized the concept of friction as referring to the totality of “uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen and their effect on decisions, morale and actions.”

This is an excellent idea placed in one word. I'm in awe - March 31, 2024 @ 2:23 PM

friction had to be worked with. It actually provided opportunities, and could be used by a general just as much as it could be used by an engineer. The first thing was to recognize its existence. The second thing was to understand its nature. That was and remains more difficult.

Imagine a traveler who decides toward the evening to cover a further two stages on his day’s journey, some four or five hours’ ride with post-horses along the main highway; nothing very much. Then when he comes to the first stage he discovers that there are no horses, or only poor ones; then a mountainous area and ruined tracks; it gets dark, and after all his trials he is mightily pleased to reach the final stage and get some miserable roof over his head. So it is that in war, through an accumulation of innumerable petty circumstances which could never be taken into account on paper, everything deteriorates and you find that you are far from achieving your goal.

Intuition Pump for Friction March 31, 2024 @ 2:27 PM

The very business of getting an organization made up of individuals, no matter how disciplined, to pursue a collective goal produces friction just as surely as applying the brakes of a car. Because of the role of chance, actual outcomes are inherently unpredictable. Furthermore, in war physical and psychological stress heightens friction still further. In this case we find that we cannot do what we planned, so once again our desired outcome is not achieved. There is a gap between the actions we planned and the actions actually taken. Of course, we might not have achieved our desired outcome even if we had done what we planned, because our plan may well have been flawed, as in the case of the traveler. We cannot tell.

If Clausewitz is right, no one should develop a strategy without taking into account the effects of organizational friction. Yet we continue to be surprised and frustrated when it manifests itself. We tend to think everything has gone wrong when in fact everything has gone normally. The existence of friction is why armies need officers and businesses need managers. Anticipating and dealing with it form the core of managerial work. Recognizing that is liberating in itself.

Generic Sources of Friction
Imperfect Information 
Imperfect Transmitting and Processing of Information
External Factors

We experience friction because of our cognitive limits as human beings. We have limited knowledge about the present and the future is fundamentally unknowable.

Hence complexity itself exacerbates other sources of friction. If information is imperfect, judgments must be based on probabilities, for much is simply unknowable. The story of the journey, each stage of which involved factors unknown in advance (such as the state of the road, the availability of horses), illustrates how complexity can reduce the chances of overall success. There is only one way the plan can go right, but any number of ways in which it can go wrong. Again, if one had perfect information in advance, one might be able to do something about it.

Systems are nonlinear when the state they are in at a given point in time provides the input to a feedback mechanism which determines the new state of the system. Some such systems are sensitively dependent on the starting state. If so, future states are unpredictable. Such systems are called “chaotic.” The term is misleading because their states are not random, merely unknowable.

Friction is a function of the finitude of the human condition – the fact that our knowledge is limited and the fact that we are independent agents.34 It matters when we work together in organizations because we are then trying to overcome our limitations as individuals by pooling our knowledge in order to achieve a collective purpose. Our limited knowledge is due to things we could know in principle but happen not to – that is, lack of information – and things we could not know even in principle – that is, unpredictable events. And the fact that we are independent agents with wills of our own means that there is further information loss in transmitting and processing information between each other, and we can react differently to that information – even if it is perfectly transferred – because we have independent wills.

The problem of strategy implementation is often reduced to one issue: the gap between plans and actions. How do we get an organization actually to carry out what has been agreed? However, because of the nature of the environment, even if the organization executes the plan, there is no guarantee that the actual outcomes will match the desired ones; that is, the ones the plan was intended to achieve. The two gaps interact to exacerbate each other. In both cases there is uncertainty between inputs and outputs. The problem of achieving an organization’s goals is not merely one of getting it to act, but of getting it to act in such a way that what is actually achieved is what was wanted in the first place. We have to link the internal and external aspects of friction and overcome them both at the same time. There is a third gap, the one between the two, which we must also overcome

In the case of all three elements – plans, actions, and outcomes – there is a difference between the actual and the ideal. The ultimate evidence for this is that the actual outcomes differ from the desired ones. That means that the actions actually taken were different from those we should have taken.

Our plans are imperfect because we lack knowledge. We may not have gathered enough information about the situation or we may have interpreted it wrongly. We may have overestimated our own capabilities. We may have made false assumptions about the actions of others or about what will happen in a future which is fundamentally unknowable.

Our actions are not always those we plan because it is so difficult to align everybody who needs to act. The message about what we want them to do may not get through, or it may be misunderstood. They may act too early or too late. They may not believe that what we want them to do is the right thing to do, or they may not be willing to do it. They may simply have different priorities.

And even if we make good plans based on the best information available at the time and people do exactly what we plan, the effects of our actions may not be the ones we wanted because the environment is nonlinear and hence is fundamentally unpredictable. As time passes the situation will change, chance events will occur, other agents such as customers or competitors will take actions of their own, and we will find that what we do is only one factor among several which create a new situation. Even if the situation is stable, some of the effects of our actions will be unintended. Reality will change like the movement of the pendulum. We are just one of the magnets.

We could name the gap between outcomes and plans the knowledge gap, the gap between plans and actions the alignment gap, and the gap between actions and outcomes the effects gap.

These real uncertainties produce general psychological uncertainty. We do not like uncertainty. It makes us feel uncomfortable, so we try to eliminate it. Thus it is that each of the gaps provokes a common response,

A gap in knowledge prompts the collection of more data. In the case of the technology company, it was about the markets and more especially what was actually going on internally. Seeking to improve its information-gathering and processing capability, the company became more complex, adding committees and overlays, some permanent, some ad hoc. The pharmaceutical company was already immersed in information and had well-established processes for gathering and processing it, because developing drugs is fundamentally about gathering information and turning it into knowledge. So it pumped more data through its existing systems. No one took a decision to do so. It was just the natural result of how the organization as a system was programmed. In both cases, the data flow paralyzed decision making, because no matter how much there was, there was always more to obtain. Meetings were about analyzing problems rather than resolving them.

A gap in alignment is often indicated by top-level frustration and lower-level confusion. Both organizations exhibited this. Top-level managers felt increasing pressure to specify exactly what they wanted people to do. They began to stress actions rather than outcomes, in the one case by spelling things out “in painful detail” and in the other through SOPs and central processes. Some of the detail was translated into initiatives which began to proliferate, creating more confusion as well as more work. In their confusion, lower levels imitated the higher ones and identified problems of their own, which resulted in local initiatives. In a complex matrix organization when initiatives come from all directions they usually clash, creating dilemmas over what to do, like the one faced by the head of regulatory affairs in the drug company. Senior people began to intervene personally in details, throwing those actually responsible off course. Such behavior sends a general message that junior people are not trusted to make decisions. They therefore begin to delegate upward as a matter of course, ending in senior executives being asked to decide about such weighty matters as which color to paint a meeting room. Top-level frustration goes up a notch as people thereby demonstrate that they really cannot decide anything for themselves, and so the cycle goes on.

gap in effects is typically responded to by an increase in control. The favorite control mechanism is metrics. As time goes on, the emphasis is switched from outputs to inputs, so that in the end everybody’s actions are detailed, analyzed, and controlled by a few people who look to everyone else as if they are seeking to become omniscient about the world outside and omnipotent in the world inside. Controls have a cost.

This cannot and should not go overlooked. The uncertainties causes us to flinch in predictable ways. 
When we don't feel like we have enough information we seek more information as if that will solve the problem. The plot is lost and everything becomes a quest for more information (more dashboards, more experiments, more analytics, more data requests, more meetings to discuss all of the above)
When we feel like we're not aligned, we give more detailed instructions as if that will solve the problem. We get so detailed that it creates hesitations, dilemma's, conflicting asks, mistrust.
When we feel like we're not having the right effects we get obsessive over metrics and making sure we're actually doing the right prescribed actions instead of taking stock of if our prescribed actions actually lead to the intended outcomes.  March 31, 2024 @ 3:45 PM

These natural reactions do not simply fail to solve the problem, they make it worse. Because the cause-and-effect cycles are systemic and reciprocal, all three reactions interact with and exacerbate each other. Gathering and processing more information costs money and time. It is driven by a desire for certainty, a quest which can never be satisfied. Time passes and decision making slows down. Providing more detail is a natural response to a demand for clarity. But clarity and detail are not the same thing at all. The pursuit of detail actually increases noise and so makes it less clear what really matters. Details change quickly, so the more details we put in our plans the less robust they will be. Opportunities are missed, and by the time a decision has been made, the situation has changed, prompting further information gathering and analysis. The more detailed we make action plans, the more we constrain what people can do, which increases rigidity. Controls add to costs, slow things down further, and increase rigidity. People become demotivated and keep their attention firmly fixed on their KPIs, which become more important than what they were supposed to measure. Commitment is replaced by compliance, energy is sapped, and morale declines. The end result is a slow, expensive robot. We need to find another way.

Any potential solution must address the three gaps. It must encompass planning effectively, finding a way of creating alignment and enabling people to take appropriate actions in the light of the situation they actually face at the time. We will have to work on how direction is formulated and given, how we communicate, and what behaviors and values govern the way we work together.

Bungay, Stephen. The Art of Action: How Leaders Close the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results (p. 49). Quercus. Kindle Edition.

Elements of a solution

The guidance opens by emphasizing the importance of clear decisions in a context of high friction, which renders perfect planning impossible:

With darkness all around you, you have to develop a feeling for what is right, often based on little more than guesswork, and issue orders in the knowledge that their execution will be hindered by all manner of random accidents and unpredictable obstacles. In this fog of uncertainty, the one thing that must be certain is your own decision… the surest way of achieving your goal is through the single-minded pursuit of simple actions.

Specifying too much detail actually shakes confidence and creates uncertainty if things do not turn out as anticipated. Going into too much detail makes a senior commander a hostage to fortune, because in a rapidly changing environment, the greater the level of detail, the less likely it is to fit the actual situation. It also creates uncertainty about what really matters. Far from overcoming it, a mass of instructions actually creates more friction in the form of noise, and confuses subordinates because the situation may demand one thing and the instructions say another. Furthermore, trying to get results by directly taking charge of things at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy is dysfunctional:

The higher the level of command, the shorter and more general the orders should be. The next level down should add whatever further specification it feels to be necessary, and the details of execution are left to verbal instructions or perhaps a word of command. This ensures that everyone retains freedom of movement and decision within the bounds of their authority.

The rule to follow is that an order should contain all, but also only, what subordinates cannot determine for themselves to achieve a particular purpose.

The overall direction should be communicated in a cascade. Direction from the highest level should be kept high level. The levels below add appropriate detail. Each level is guided by the intention of the one above, which whenever possible was articulated in a face-to-face briefing as well as in writing. Understanding the context and the overall intention is what enables junior officers to take independent decisions if the specific orders issued to them become invalid because of a change in the situation.

So it is that by 1869, von Moltke had already outlined a way of closing the three gaps. His solution to each runs directly counter to our intuitive responses. On the knowledge gap, he emphasizes the need to plan only what can be planned, the need for judgment and timely decision making based on what one can ascertain, and the acceptance of uncertainty. A decision maker will of course seek to gather whatever relevant information they can in the time available. However, some residual uncertainty will always remain. Rather than seeking to fill the gap completely by gathering more data, von Moltke suggests adjusting the scope of plans to the available knowledge and using it to identify the essentials. On the alignment gap, he recommends a cascade process with each level adding something to the one above, but all united by an understanding of the intentions of the higher levels. Plans should be appropriate to their level: the lower the level, the more specific and detailed they should be. Each level will know less about the overall context and more about the specific situation than the level above. So the higher level should tell the lower level what it needs to know about the situation of the organization as a whole, the overall purpose, the immediate intention of the higher level, the specific role the unit is to play and the roles of other units around it, the freedoms it has, and any constraints it has to observe. That is all it needs to know. With this knowledge of what to achieve and why, it should itself decide about how to achieve it. It will have more accurate and more up-to-date information about the situation it is facing and will therefore know best what specific actions to take. By exercising self-restraint in telling its subordinate unit only what it needs to know, the higher-level unit clears space within which the subordinate is free to take decisions and act. On the effects gap, he encourages the use of individual initiative within boundaries and actually requires junior people to depart from the letter of their instructions if the situation demands it in order to fulfill the intent. Rather than tightening control, he suggests that as long as the intentions of the higher levels are made clear, individual initiative can be relied on to adjust actions according to the situation. The imposed discipline of controls and sanctions is replaced by the self-discipline of responsibility. There should be no fear of punishment if a calculated risk fails to pay off. Sins of omission should be regarded as far more serious than sins of commission.

The insight is that alignment needs to be achieved around intent, and autonomy should be granted around actions. Intent is expressed in terms of what to achieve and why. Autonomy concerns the actions taken in order to realize the intent; in other words, about what to do and how. By requiring his commanders to distinguish between “what and why” on the one hand and “how” on the other, von Moltke creates an organization which is positioned at the top right of this chart.

The result is that the organization’s performance does not depend on its being led by a military genius, because it becomes an intelligent organization. Rather than relying on exceptional – and by definition rare – individuals, this solution raises the performance of the average.19 Being able to adapt to circumstances, the organization will tend to make corrective decisions while executing, even if the overall plan is flawed.

Is the alpha here to short strategy and long programs and enablement? Instead of better strategy, just better "campaigns" (A campaign is a phase of a war involving a series of operations related in time and space and aimed towards a single, specific, strategic objective or result) and "weaponry" to execute the mission?  March 31, 2024 @ 4:37 PM

By building this sort of capability, the risks of a flawed strategy have been mitigated because the intelligence of the whole organization has been applied to determining how the strategy unfolds, and that process has been so extended over time that it is for all practical purposes continuous. He has in effect turned strategy development and strategy execution into a distinction without a difference.

This is what Frank Slootman said and I'm not surprised this is found in war books as he was a big fan of these and the analogy of Business to War March 31, 2024 @ 4:38 PM

A soldier did not have the choice whether to obey, but he was left free to choose how to obey.

The guiding principle of action was to be the intent of the higher commander. Officers were to ask themselves the question: “What would my superior order me to do if he were in my position and knew what I know?”

The basis of leadership are the mission (Auftrag) and the situation. 
	The mission identifies the goal to be achieved and must always be the point of focus. A mission which tries to encompass multiple tasks can all too easily obscure what really matters. 
	An uncertain situation is normal. It will rarely be possible to gain more accurate information about the state of the enemy. While you should obviously try to find out as much as possible, waiting for more information in a critical situation is seldom a sign of incisive leadership, and often a serious mistake. 
	The mission and the situation lead to a decision. If the mission no longer provides a sufficient basis for action, or if it is made redundant by events, the decision has to take this into account. If anyone changes a mission or does not carry it out, he must report the fact and he alone bears responsibility for the consequences. He must always act within the framework of the whole. 
	A decision should pursue a clear goal with all the means available. It is the resolution of the leader which carries it through. The will to succeed can in itself often bring about success. 		  
	Once a decision has been made, it should only be departed from in exceptional circumstances. In the vicissitudes of war, however, sticking rigidly to a decision can also be a mistake. Part of the art of leadership is to recognize the time and circumstances in which a new decision is called for. 
	A leader must grant his subordinates freedom of action as long as doing so does not compromise his intention. He must not, however, allow them to make a decision for which he is responsible.

This is interesting. It's a constant pinging of a desired future and the present and making decisions off that March 31, 2024 @ 4:58 PM

He realized that in order to achieve this he needed to transform the mentality of the British officer corps. In order to do that, he used the same instrument von Moltke had: training and education.

Fascinating. See above note on shorting strategy and longing training and education (enablement) March 31, 2024 @ 5:03 PM

Adopting mission command as an operating model is not a matter of setting up some processes, but of mastering some skills, perhaps more precisely called “disciplines.” Only when those skills have been mastered can the process be adopted. Taking over the processes without building the skills is simply pouring old wine into new bottles, adopting a dead form.

Skills, Disciplines, Values... whatever it is, it's a fingertip feel of what needs to be done given an uncertain environment. March 31, 2024 @ 5:11 PM

The thinking–doing loop is kept as short as possible so as to reduce uncertainty and increase tempo. However, the intended outcomes may be far away in time. The key is not to plan the whole journey but to set direction and allow the organization to navigate.

BACKBRIEF: HAS THE SITUATION CHANGED? 
No – our brief is valid 
Yes – we have to change some tasks, but what we are trying to achieve is still valid 
Yes – and we have to change what we are trying to achieve

──────────────────────
🧩 Problem-Solve: "Generating activity is not a problem; in fact it is easy. The fact that it is easy makes the real pr..."

What problems this knowledge solves
Mistaking busyness for progress — A team or org is running at full capacity (meetings, initiatives, sprints) yet key outcomes aren't moving; this knowledge names why adding more activity is the wrong lever.
Diagnosing a stalled strategy — Leadership senses something is wrong but the dashboards show green (high output, high activity); this knowledge points to the gap between volume of action and effective action as the real signal to investigate.
Breaking the "do more" doom loop — When effects disappoint, the instinct is to pile on more initiatives (the effects gap response described later in the document); this knowledge is the early warning that more activity compounds the problem rather than solving it.
Prioritization failures masked by effort — Teams feel they can't be blamed because they're working hard; this knowledge provides the framing to separate effort from impact and hold the right conversation.
Problem-solving approach: Diagnosing a stalled strategy hidden behind high activity
1. Identify
Symptom (plain): The organization is visibly busy — full calendars, many initiatives, high output metrics — but strategic outcomes (revenue, product milestones, customer results) are not moving at the expected rate.
Separate symptom from assumed cause: The assumed cause is usually "we need more resources" or "execution is slow." The actual cause may be that activity is mis-aimed, not insufficient.
Is / Is Not boundary:
Is: High volume of tasks completed, meetings held, reports produced, initiatives launched.
Is Not: Movement on the 2–3 outcomes the organization actually defined as success.
When: Visible at quarterly reviews; invisible week-to-week because local activity looks healthy.
Definition of "solved": Leadership can point to a short list of outcomes that are measurably progressing, and can trace a direct line from current team activity to those outcomes — with low-impact activity visibly reduced or stopped.
2. Diagnose
5 Whys (illustrative chain):
Why aren't outcomes moving? → Actions aren't producing the intended effects.
Why aren't actions producing effects? → Many actions aren't connected to the strategic intent.
Why aren't they connected? → People were given tasks, not intent ("what and why" was never communicated).
Why wasn't intent communicated? → Plans were detailed and prescriptive (alignment gap response), substituting instructions for understanding.
Why did we go prescriptive? → Uncertainty made leaders feel they needed to control how, not just what to achieve.
Root cause vs. contributing factors: Root cause is the alignment gap — people don't know what really matters, so they fill time with activity that feels productive. Contributing factor: the effects gap response (more metrics, more controls) reinforces compliance over judgment.
Key diagnostic question: For each major workstream, ask: "If this stopped tomorrow, would it affect the outcomes we said matter most?" If the answer is "probably not," that is disguised inactivity.
3. Discovery
Go to the gemba: Sit in a team's weekly standup or review. Count how many agenda items can be directly mapped to a named strategic outcome. The ratio of "unmappable" items is your friction signal.
Change analysis: When did the busyness-without-progress pattern begin? Correlate with: a new planning cycle, a reorg, a period of leadership pressure — these often trigger the cascade of initiatives the document describes.
Stakeholder map: Senior leaders feel frustrated; middle layers feel overwhelmed and confused; junior levels are delegating upward. This exact pattern is named in the document as the alignment gap made visible.
Constraints: Time pressure often makes leaders add initiatives rather than cut — surface this bias explicitly before proposing any solution.
4. Solution
Option A (Minimal): Run a one-page "activity audit" — list all current initiatives, map each to a stated outcome, kill or pause anything unmapped.
Option B (Structural): Restate strategy as intent (what + why), not a task list. Use the cascade described by von Moltke: top level sets intent, each level below adds only the specificity it needs, teams decide how.
Option C (Cultural): Invest in training and education so teams develop the judgment to self-select high-impact actions — the document's "long enablement" insight.
Best fit: Option B, preceded by Option A. The audit creates the burning platform; restating intent as direction (not prescription) addresses the root cause.
Concrete steps: (1) Name the 3 outcomes that matter most this quarter. (2) For each, write one sentence of intent: what we want to achieve and why. (3) Brief each team lead face-to-face. (4) Ask them to backbrief: "What will you do as a result?" (5) Cut any initiative that no team lead maps to the intent.
Fallback: If intent-setting stalls in committee, use the backbrief question alone — it forces the mapping conversation without requiring a full replan.
5. Solve & Verify
Start small and reversible: Run the intent cascade for one team or one product line first; don't reorganize everything simultaneously.
Verify against Phase 1 definition: Can leadership now trace a direct line from team activity to the named outcomes? Has the number of active initiatives decreased?
Check for regressions: Watch for the "effects gap" response — if outcomes still lag, the instinct will be to add metrics and controls. Name this trap explicitly in the next leadership review.
Document: Record which initiatives were cut and why; this becomes the institutional memory that prevents re-accumulation of disguised inactivity.
Recurrence: This pattern recurs under uncertainty. The structural fix is ongoing intent-communication discipline (the thinking–doing loop kept short), not a one-time audit.

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